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An urn-ball probabilistic model of the labour market is developed. Agents can be 
employed, (voluntary or involuntary) unemployed or entrepreneurs. The analytical long 
run equilibrium probabilities for each state and the matching function are derived. Then, 
the out-of-equilibrium dynamics are investigated through an agent-based simulation, 
which provides also results on firm demography. The simulation model is finally used 
to investigate departures from maximizing individual behaviour and the effects of more 
realistic assumptions about profits and the business cycle.    2
Introduction 
 
In the economic literature, search models have become the standard reference for the 
analysis of unemployment. They originated from Stigler (1961) work on the economics 
of information, who considered a buyer choosing the number of price quotations before 
beginning the search process, in order to minimize expected price plus sampling cost. 
Search models have been first applied to labour issues, in a more dynamic perspective, 
with the work of Phelps et al. (1970). A surge in this strand of the literature occurred 
during the eighties, with major contributions by Diamond (1981, 1982a,b), Mortensen 
(1982a,b), and Pissarides (1984a,b). Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides 
(2000a,b) themselves provide extensive reviews of search models for the labour market.  
 
With respect to the standard competitive equilibrium theory, in search models trade is 
explicitly affected by the dynamics of the process, and by the related uncertainty. «One 
thing competitive theory gets right with supply and demand is that prices are determined 
endogenously. Then again, one thing it gets wrong is that they are not chosen by anyone 
in the model, but by something outside the model – the auctioneer. The auctioneer is a 
very convenient device for solving or at least getting around the problem of price 
formation, but presumably this cannot be the last word on the problem. Search models 
not only allow us to discuss ways in which wages and other prices are determined by 
agents in the model, they allow us to study a wide variety of alternative ways of 
endogenizing prices, including bilateral bargaining, ex ante wage posting by employers, 
and other mechanisms» (Rogerson and Wright, 2002). Thus, to a certain extent, search 
theory goes in the direction auspicated by ACE practitioners, as described in Richiardi 
(2003). Moreover search theory, with its focus on the analysis of frictions, has found 
many interesting applications also outside the field of labour economics. Monetary 
economics (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993; Shi, 1995; Trejos and Wright, 1995), industrial 
organization (Jovanovic, 1982; Jovanovic and Rob, 1989; Jovanovic and MacDonald, 
1994), and family economics (Mortensen, 1988; Burdett and Coles, 1997, 1999; Shimer 
and Smith, 2000) have all benefited from this theoretical framework. 
   3
However, search models remain intrinsically equilibrium models, developed in the 
framework of optimising behaviour. Search models rely on three pillars: the decision of 
workers, the decision of firms and the wage setting mechanism. Search activity is costly 
for individuals, who compare the utility of possibly getting a job with their actual utility 
(which may come from unemployment benefits, or from their present wage if on-the-job 
search is allowed), thus computing the equivalent of an arbitrage equation for the 
valuation of an option (selling their unit of labour) in a perfect capital market.  
 
When two-sided search is considered, instead of considering an exogenous number of 
vacancies as in simpler models, the search process by firms is explicitly modelled. 
Vacancy opening is costly for firms. They thus make optimising choices by comparing 
expected profits from posting a vacancy with those of leaving the growth opportunity 
unexploited. In a competitive economy these profits have to be null, allowing for 
simpler solutions.  
 
Wage setting follows two approaches. The most common considers a Nash bargaining 
solution (Diamond, 1982), in order to split the rent generated by the search costs 
between the firm and the applicant. The second approach considers wage posting by the 
firms. Three different types of wage posting have been proposed. With a single offer, 
private information mechanism, workers are revealed the wage offer only upon 
(sequential) contact (Diamond, 1971). With a competitive search mechanism, firms 
publicly post their wage offers, workers apply to only one job at a time but they are not 
sure to get the job, should they apply, because it may have already gone to another 
applicant (Moen, 1997). Finally, with a multiple offers, private information mechanism 
workers are allowed to consider more than one wage offer at a time (as with on-the-job 
search), but still they get to know the offer only upon contact (Burdett and Judd, 1983). 
 
A related problem with wage posting is determining how firms choose wage offers. 
Ideally, this should also be endogenous, and lead to a non-degenerate wage distribution, 
in equilibrium. Diamond (1971) was one of the first to address this issue. However, his 
model produces a single equilibrium wage, equal to the value of unemployment   4
benefits, even if firms have different productivity. A number of models leading to non-
degenerate wage distributions, both in the market for goods and in the market for 
labour, were subsequently developed. Firms offer higher wages in order to attract or 
retain more or better workers. A number of mechanisms, including on-the-job search 
and workers heterogeneity (with respect to the utility deriving from unemployment, or 
to productivity) can lead to such an outcome - see Rogerson and Wright (2002) for a 
detailed survey. 
 
Ex-ante suitable jobs may include all stock of jobs (urn-ball matching) or, in case job 
seekers have complete information about available vacancies
1 may include only new 
jobs (stock-flow matching).  
 
From an aggregate point of view, the search activity leads to a matching function 
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1990), which relates the number of matches with input 
variables like the unemployment rate and the number of vacancies (see Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001). The analysis of labour markets through aggregate matching models is 
a stream of research on its own. While search models have demonstrated the existence 
of equilibria in a decentralized wage setting with frictions, starting from the analysis of 
the micro-foundations of such a market, the matching function «as well as recognizing 
the simultaneous occurrence of unemployment and vacancies»
2 has focused on the 
flows of hires, although from an aggregate point of view. Only recently the links 
between micro-founded search models and the aggregate matching function has been 
investigated. The matching function has an informational content similar to that of the 
production function in a production process. However, most attempts to derive it from 
its micro-foundations do not take into consideration the relationship fact that the number 
of vacancies also depends on unemployment, the two things being jointly determined 
and endogenous. 
 
                                            
1 and thus unmatched workers and vacancies will not match, even in future rounds 
2 Ballot (2002)   5
The search framework is so well established that many contributions have explored 
extension of the basic models. Shimer and Smith (2001), in a general search model that 
abstracts from the labour market, show that the decentralised equilibrium with 
heterogeneous agents is inefficient. Acemoglu (2000) and Albrecht and Vroman (2000) 
introduce skill heterogeneity among workers, and investigate the implications for wages 
and unemployment rate for each group. Search intensity has been endogenised as a 
choice variable (Pissarides, 2000). Albrecht et al. (2003) consider the implications of 
multiple applications by job seekers. 
 
However, search models still ignore many features of real labour markets. In particular, 
firms hardly exist. They are replaced by vacancies, i.e. by single-job entities. Old firms 
never die; new firms never come to life: instead, jobs appear and disappear. Job creation 
is endogenous, but job destruction is generally exogenously given. A first attempt to 
provide a more realistic description of layoffs is found in Burdett and Mortensen (1980), 
where each job offer is characterised by two variables – a wage and a constant 
probability of the position being closed down. Clearly, this is still a very poor way of 
considering job destruction. In order to make advances, two mechanisms have been 
conceived. One considers (stochastic) shocks to the productivity of each job. The job is 
then closed down if its productivity falls beyond a minimum threshold (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994). An alternative way involves considering job obsolescence over time. 
Old jobs offer smaller wages. Thus, they’ll find increasingly hard to attract workers, and 
will eventually closed down (Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Caballero and Hammour, 
1994). Note that in both cases job destruction does not depend on unemployment. 
Having only a very naïf description of firms, these models never allow job creation and 
job destruction to depend on variables such as the number of firms in the market, or the 
dimension of the firm. Moreover, job destruction is generally not modelled separately 
from firing decisions. This implies the impossibility of distinguishing between 
employee and job turnover. The only other way to include such a distinction without 
modelling layoffs is through on-the-job-search. The number of vacancies must then be 
updated accordingly: it must be higher the greater the number of job-to-job changes. 
Burdett (1978) provides a first attempt to model on-the-job search. However, in his   6
model there is no determination of the number of vacancies. Thus, job quits may be 
indifferently interpreted as job destruction. On-the-job search intensity may depend on 
experienced wage shocks, or on learning about the utility deriving from that work 
(Jovanovic, 1979). In particular, since learning increases with tenure, models like 
Jovanovic’s imply that workers with longer tenures are less likely to quit, and are more 
likely to be gaining higher wages.  
 
Also, the realism of optimising behaviour could be questioned. There is a strong 
empirical literature showing that labour market choices are often made on the basis of 
rules of thumbs, which may be inefficient (Sargent, 1993; Leijonhufvud, 1993).  
 
Overall, search models offer a coherent modelling framework. However, different 
models can be distinguished along many dimensions, while sharing common tools and 
methods. Most models, aimed at investigating a particular issue, only include some of 
the relevant features. Actually, due to the analytical difficulty involved, it is indeed very 
hard to think of a comprehensive search model, in which investigate for instance the 
effects of different individual and firm behaviour, or different institutional settings.   
This could be pursued in a simulation model. However, to the extent of my knowledge 
only few attempts have been made to replicate the working of a complete labour market. 
Ballot (2003) describes a simulation of the French labour market, with bounded 
rationality workers and firms, a rich specification of the search process on both sides for 
different sets of institutional rules and the presence of intermediaries. Interesting and 
comprehensive microsimulation models of the labour market have been developed, in 
the spirit of Orcutt (1957, 1961), but their focus is most often on the supply of labour 
and the interaction with demographic issues like ageing (see for instance Martini, 1997). 
Nagel (1998) has a search model where agents receive wage offers and perform a 
simple hill-climbing towards the company that pays the highest wage. However, firms 
can reject applicants because of bankruptcy, in which case workers start again from an 
unemployment state. The focus is on the implications of the model on inflation 
dynamics. Neugart (2003) focuses on recovering by means of an ACE model some 
empirical properties of the aggregate matching function.   7
 
The purpose of this paper is adding the analysis of firm dynamics in a search-theoretic 
framework. In order to remain more closely related to the existing literature, I provide a 
simple reference analytical model. Then, an agent-based simulation of the model is 
developed, in order to explore the out-of-equilibrium dynamics and the effects of some 
violations in the main assumptions. In particular, a more behaviourist version of the 
model, with agents following rules-of-thumb, will be presented. Finally, more structured 
hypothesis on the value of some relevant parameters governing the business cycle and 
the profitability of firms will be introduced. The model is set-up in section 1. State 
transition probabilities are derived in section 2. Section 3 characterizes the long-run 
equilibrium of the system. Section 4 presents an agent-based implementation of the 
model, and investigates firm dynamics. Section 5 deals with the above mentioned 
extensions of the model, while section 6 concludes. 
 
1. The model 
 
The model belongs to the class of urn-ball search models, with private information, 
single offer. However, a rather different modelling approach is considered. Optimal 
individual choice rules are outlined, given a two-step decision process where workers 
have inertia and change their job only when their satisfaction level falls below a 
threshold, irrespective of the utility deriving from other choices. Then, the a-priori 
probability of each choice being taken, in equilibrium, is computed. This allows filling a 
transition matrix, for each state of the system (unemployment, employment, self-
employment), defining a regular Markov chain. The long-run probabilities for each state 
are then computed, using the global balance equations implied by the Markov chain. 
The approach is similar to that of Diermeier and Van Mieghem (2001). 
 
1.1 Labour supply 
Individuals can be self-employed, employed or unemployed. At every period they face 
the following four possible choices: 
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Table 1: Individual choices 
 
Stay (*)  Remain in the present organization (firm) 
Join  Apply for another job 
Start  Found a new startup 
Relax  Withdraw from the labor market  
(*) only if currently employed 
 
Thus, the state transition matrix looks like the following table: 
 
Table 2: State transition matrix 
 
  Ending state 
Starting state  Unemployed Employed Self-employed 
Unemployed  Unsuccessful Join 
Relax 











Each individual has a reservation wage, r (which may vary over time). Individuals are 
risk neutral. They first compute their expected wage in the present state, and compare it 
with their reservation wage. They try to change their status only if their expected wage 
is below r. Thus, they do not compute every time an expected wage for every possible 
decision. As many real people do, they have inertia, and prefer not to change, unless 
they are forced to. If this is the case, they decide either to look for a new job, or to 
become entrepreneurs, or to remain idle, by comparing the expected payoffs of the 
different choices. Once they decide to apply for other jobs, they quit their present firm, 
if employed. Should all applications fail, they thus fall into unemployment. 
 
Letting w
e be the expected wage, choices are thus given by: 
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Table 3: Comparing expected utility 
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It is now possible to fill in the probabilities for each cell of the ‘a priori’ transition 
matrix:    10
Table 4: State transition matrix 
 
  Ending state 
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There is a fixed number of  RELAX START JOIN STAY N N N N N + + + =  individuals. The 
expected number of workers willing to stay is  STAY STAY NeP N =  and the expected 
number of applicants is  () () ( ) JOIN STAY JOIN STAY JOIN P eP N P P e u N N − = − + = 1 1 . Finally, 
the expected number of new start-ups is 
() ( ) START STAY START START STAY START P eP N NuP P P Ne N − = + − = 1 1 . In addition, there is a 
(variable) number of Ft firms. Individuals and firms are not located in space: every 
worker can contact any firm. 
 
1.2 Labor demand 
Each individual has, each period, a business idea, whose exploitation requires a new 
startup and Ji units of labor, with Ji randomly extracted from a distribution DJ. These 
business opportunities are valid only for one period. Once a firm is set up, job 
opportunities grow at a rate gt, with g,t randomly extracted each period for all firms from 
a distribution Dg. g,t can be interpreted as a business cycle parameter. Although in the 
final section auto-correlation of g will be considered, in the basic model it is thought to 
be purely stochastic. This means that a Wf employees firm at time t will try to become a 
Wf  
.(1 + gt ) employees firm at time t + 1, thus opening (or destroying) Wf 
. g,t positions. 
The number of available vacancies will be equal to the number of new positions, plus 
the number of old positions left vacant by employees that have decided to leave the 
firm. Workers make their decisions before the realization gt is revealed. Note that a 
positive realization of gt does not automatically imply a particular firm or the economy 
as a whole will expand, since vacancies could remain unfilled.   11
1.3 Wages 
All firms in the market are able to get every period a market return of Wf  
.(1 + sf,t), 
where (1 + sf,t) is an a priori unknown firm- and time-specific multiplier, with sf,t 
randomly extracted from a distribution Ds. Start-ups bring an additional cost of α
.Ji for 
the entrepreneur. This cost is proportional to the size of the business opportunity, and 
accounts for all kind of set-up costs. After the first period, all differences between 
employer and employees disappear. 
The wage shock sf,t+1 becomes known to employees before they take their decision 
about whether to leave the firm, but it is not known to applicants. Here, sf,t accounts 
both for monetary and non-monetary rewards, which could well be assumed to be an 
experience good. All employees are equally rewarded. Wages are thus equal to (1 + sf,t ). 
Of course it would be reasonable to think of sf,t as being correlated over time, or across 
firms, or to be somehow related to the business cycle parameter g t. Section 5 will put 
some more structure on this parameter. Here, for the sake of simplicity, it is considered 
to be purely idiosyncratic.   
Thus, each employee receives wf,t = (1 + sf,t ), while the founder receives (1 + sf,t ) - α Ji . 
Workers are aware of the uncertainty over s  in the aggregate. Consequently, their 
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Since sf is independent of sj, for any f and j, knowing that w
e
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As explained above, at every period firms decide how many jobs they can sustain. Jobs 
are first given to old employees, by means of a tournament. Only in case the number of 
jobs exceeds the number of employees willing to stay, new vacancies are opened. 
If NSTAY,f and Jf are respectively the number of employees willing to stay and the number 
of job opportunities available at firm f, the probability of being confirmed, once a Stay 













. The a priori probability of a successful 
Stay, given the worker is employed and has decided to stay, is: 
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In the simplest case with no heterogeneity among workers (i.e. ri = r), all workers in the 
same firm take the same decision, regarding whether to stay or not. 
If they all decide to stay, the probability of being confirmed depends on the business 
cycle parameter gt. For positive realizations of gt this probability is 1, while for negative 
realizations this probability is 1+ E [gt| gt  <0]. Suppose g  is uniformly distributed 
between gL ∈ (-1,0) and gH >0, then: 
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1.5 Join 
Workers apply to vacancies, not to firms, as in standard search models. Each worker has 
a fixed number of A applications to send, in case he decides to look for a new job. 
Vacancies collect all their applications (if any) and select randomly a prospective 
worker. The worker accepts the first offer he receives. He discovers the firm specific 
wage only after being hired. 
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1
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With homogenous workers, all employees take the same decision, regarding whether to 
stay or not. Thus, the expected number of vacancies in any one firm, given no 
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and the total expected number of vacancies in existing firms is: 
 
[9]  () () () ( )
() L H
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Note again that the expected value of g is not affected by the fact that the worker will 
consider the option to apply for another job only after having decided to quit his present 
firm, since individual wage shocks are uncorrelated.  
 
The expected number of vacancies in new start-ups is: 
 
[10]  () J P eP N V START STAY
e
S − = 1  
 





e V V V + = . 
 
Following Albrecht et al. (2003), the probability that any one applicant has applied to a 
particular vacancy is A/V




The probability that the vacancy has at least an application to consider, assuming 
A V
e ≥ , is: 
 
[11]   
  
From the perspective of the individual, when one application is sent out, the probability 
that it is selected is 1 over the number of applications received for that vacancy. On 
average, this number is equal to the number of applications sent out (
JOIN AN ) over the 
number of vacancies that receive applications (pV
e). 








= . Note that in considering what happens to a particular vacancy we are 
considering the case  1 ≥ JOIN N . The probability of being selected for at least one 
vacancy is 1 - (1 - q)
A. Therefore, the a priori probability of a successful Join, given a 
Join decision, is: 
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At this point, letting e and u be respectively the employment and unemployment rate, it 
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In order to successfully form a start-up, no particular requirements are necessary, and at 
least one vacancy is automatically filled (the founder). Since the recruiting mechanism 
involves first choosing one applicant, and then asking if he is willing to join at the 
prospected wage, the probability that the selected applicant has not been recruited yet 
for other vacancies is proportional to the number of the selected worker’s applications 
receiving positive answers, (A-1) 










Hence, the average number of vacancies a Ji startup will be able to fill is: 
[15]  () 1 1 + ⋅ − = z J W i
e
i  
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2. Choices 
 
Supposing s is uniformly distributed between sL ∈ (-1,0) and sH >0. Substituting into 
equation [1] yields: 
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Note that the lower threshold for a, when r = 0, is a = -1 
 
Now, suppose J is uniformly distributed between JL > 0 and JH . In order to obtain PJOIN, 
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We then obtain the following results: 
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Table 5: Choices probabilities 
 
Case  PJOIN  PSTART  PRELAX  sum
I a.1  0 1  0  1 













α 1 ) 1 (
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III b.4  1 0  0  1 
V c.1  0 0  1  1 
V c.2  0 0  1  1 
V c.3  0 0  1  1 
III c.4  1 0  0  1 
 
different cases leading to the same probabilities have been grouped and labelled I to V. 
 
3. Long run equilibrium 
 
Now, case I being characterized by PJOIN = 0, the probability of getting a vacancy, 
conditional on applying for it, is equal to 1 () 1 =
SUCC



































Therefore the table above simplifies to: 
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Table 6: Choices probabilities 
 
Case  PJOIN P START P RELAX Sum 









α 1 ) 1 (
















III 1  0  0  1 
V 0  0  1  1 
Case II corresponds to cases a.3 and b.3 of table 5. 
Case III corresponds to cases a,b,c.4 of table 5 
Case V corresponds to cases c.1,2,3 of table 5 
 
 
Note that when  1
1
1










, and case III becomes very unlikely. Note also 
that the reservation wage does not directly affect individual choices, once a leave 
decision is taken.  
 
In case V the transition matrix looks like:  
 
Table 7: Case V transition matrix 
 
  Ending state 
Starting state  Unemployed Employed  Self-employed 




STAY STAYP P − 1
SUCC
STAY STAY P P ⋅ 0 
 
with unemployment being the absorbing state. Note that case V implies  0 =
SUCC
JOIN P , 
which is coherent with its premises. 
 
More generally, the transition matrix of table 4 defines a regular Markov chain with 
stationary transition probabilities. Its limiting distribution, i.e. the long run probability 
to find the process in each state, irrespective of the initial state (which is also the long 
run mean fraction of time that the process is in each state) is given by: 
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where πe, πs, πu are the long run probabilities of being employed, self-employed and 
unemployed, and 
SUCC













The system is solved numerically. The figures below report the effects of the various 
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[19] 
1000 10
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Remember that  1 ; 1 = + + ≤ RELAX START JOIN STAY P P P P . 
The effect of the reservation wage is linear (fig. 1a). Above a certain threshold, it starts 
lowering the probability of taking a Stay decision; then, as it approximates 1 it brings 
the probability of starting a new business to 0. An increasing average growth rate (fig. 
1b) increases the probability of taking a Stay decision (as 
SUCC
STAY P gets higher, i.e. there 
are more chances to be confirmed, once this decision is taken), and – once the worker 
has left – the probability to apply for a new job (as there are more vacancies; hence the 
probability of getting a new job 
SUCC
JOIN P is higher). Higher average wages (fig. 1c) 
increase the chance of staying, but – above a certain threshold – do not influence the 
other probabilities. A greater value of the start-up sunk costs α (fig. 1d) has a positive 
effect on the probability of taking a Stay decision, and of course a negative effect on the 
probability of taking a Start decision. The number of applications that can be 
contemporarily sent out by workers does not affect significantly their choices (fig. 1e). 
   22
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As for what regards the effects of the parameters on the final outcome, i.e. on the 
equilibrium state probabilities πu, πe, πs and on the number of matches M, they are 
shown in figure 2, with reference to the benchmark case outlined above. 
 
3.1 Reservation wage 
Unemployment is affected by the reservation wage, when it is above a certain threshold, 
but the relationship may appear counterintuitive: a greater reservation wage lowers the 
unemployment rate. To explain this, note first that the values of the parameters do not 
allow for type V situations, i.e. the probability of staying out of the labour market 
(taking a Relax decision) is null. Hence, there remain only two ways of becoming 
unemployed: the first one is taking a Stay decision, but not being reconfirmed in the 
same job due to a negative conjuncture; the second one is taking a Join decision, but not 
being selected for any of the A applications sent out. However, the first risk does not 
depend on r, while the second one is decreasing in r, as the number of vacancies 
increases (the number of matches also increases, as depicted in fig. 2c). Since the 
probability of taking a Stay decision is decreasing in r, the resulting relationship 
between the reservation wage and the unemployment rate has to be negative.  However, 
by allowing all parameters to change randomly (see eq. 20 below), it becomes evident 
that the probability of having a type V situation is increasing in r.  
 
Table 8: Type occurrences 
 
  type 






 0-.1  99.12 0.88 
.1-.2 98.44 1.56 
.2-.3 100.00   
.3-.4 100.00   
.4-.5 100.00   
.5-.6 99.24  0.76
.6-.7 94.12 0.74 5.15
.7-.8 86.07 2.46 11.48
.8-.9 73.87  26.13
.9-1.   59.85  40.15  24
As the number of workers having voluntarily quitted their job increases with r, they first 
decide to start a new business on their own. Then, with r approaching 1, they find more 
convenient to start sending applications around. The resulting trend for the number of 
new start-ups is tent-shaped  (fig. 2b). 
 
3.2 Average growth rate  
Higher expected growth rates increase the probability of being confirmed in the present 
job, thus increasing the probability of taking a Stay decision. This lowers the 
unemployment rate, the number of matches and the number of new start-ups at the same 
time (fig. 2d,e,f).  
 
3.3 Average wage 
A similar story holds for average wage (fig. 2g,h,i). Here, however, the correlation 
between the start-up rate and the average wage is somehow tent-shaped. High average 
wages increase the probability workers are satisfied with their present job, and thus 
reduce the incentive for starting their own business. However, low average wages 
increase the importance of the αJ sunk cost, and thus also reduce the likelihood of 
starting a new business. 
 
3.4 Start-up sunk costs 
An increase in sunk costs lowers the incentives to start a new business, increasing the 
probability of applying for other jobs. Since the probability of taking a Stay decision 
remains unaffected, the total number of vacancies decreases. Hence the positive 
correlation with the unemployment rate (fig. 2j,k,l). 
 
3.5 Number of contemporary applications 
The effect of the number of applications A is the same as in Albrecht et al. (2003), with 
respect to the number of matches (fig. 2o). This model however also allows studying its 
effects on total unemployment and new businesses. A higher A increases the probability 
of taking a Join decision (by increasing the probability at least one application is 
selected), while lowering the probability of taking a Start decision. The overall effect on   25
the total number of vacancies is decreasing in A, even if above a certain threshold this is 
slightly reversed. The unemployment rate follows this trend (since the number of people 
holding their jobs remains constant), while the figure for the number of vacancies looks 
reversed (fig. 2m,n). 
   26
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By allowing all parameters to vary, according to random extractions:  
 
[20] 
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a further characterization of the long-run equilibrium is possible. 
 
3.6 Unemployment rate 
The unemployment rate remains clearly negatively correlated with the average growth 
rate (fig. 3a). The negative correlation with the reservation wage for type II and type III 
situations, described above, almost vanishes. Moreover, as the reservation wage 
becomes high enough, it starts increasing the probability of obtaining type V situations. 
Then, the expected positive correlation is found (fig. 3b).  
 





























































3.7 New start-ups 
When looking at the share of new businesses, the negative correlation with the average 
growth rate is again found. (fig. 4a), while the tent-shaped correlation with the average 
wage becomes a sort of bell-shaped figure (fig. 4b).    30
A greater α of course lowers the incentives for new start-ups (fig. 4c), while the effects 
of a greater reservation wage are no longer easily detectable (fig. 4d).   
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3.8 The matching function 
Looking at the number of matches completes the picture. The correlation with the 
average growth rate is still clearly negative (workers are more likely to hold their job) 
(fig. 5a). The matching function still shows a positive dependence on the reservation 
wage, when it becomes big enough to influence individual choices (fig. 5b). However, it 
is no more possible to spot the negative correlation with the average wage, without 
controlling also for the other variables (fig. 5c).  
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4. Firm demography 
 
As opposed to standard search models, here vacancies are linked to firms, thus allowing 
for the analysis of firm demography. While new firms birth rate is given by the start-up 
probability derived above, firm size distribution and firm number (which is obviously 
given by the interaction of the birth and death rates) are explored by means of an agent-
based simulation. Agent-based models are computer programs that simulate the 
behaviour of the basic entities in the system (i.e. workers, vacancies and firms), given 
some interaction rules. Aggregate behaviour is thus reconstructed ‘from the bottom up’.   32
The choice of writing a simulation
3 has some implications, irrespective of the model 
specification. Generally, an analytical model is not immediately operational, i.e. the 
imaginary manual for playing the search game described by the model has to be worked 
out.  This may induce some change in the model itself. In particular, due to the non-
parallel discrete processing characteristics of most PC, the model must be sequential 
and cast in discrete time, as opposed to the analytical reference model. In addition to 
time, some other variables that are continuous in the analytical model (as the number of 
employees) have to be treated in units. Equilibrium relations cannot be used directly; 
rather, they have to be derived through non-equilibrium steps. For instance, the number 
of people expected to take a Join decision, which in the analytical model is the solution 
of an equilibrium equation involving rational expectations, is considered to be equal to 
the number of people taking a Join decision in the last period (adaptive expectations). 
Similarly, the expected number of vacancies is the number of vacancies observed in the 
last period. Therefore, the question whether this adaptive expectations version of the 
model converges towards any equilibrium at all, and whether this equilibrium is the 
same of the rational expectations version, naturally arises. However, it turns out that, 
but for some noise, the simulation model succeeds in recovering the equilibrium 
relations.  
 
                                            
3 The simulation is written in Java code, using JAS libraries (http://sourceforge.net/projects/jaslibrary/).   33
Figure 6: Analytical vs. simulation results (parameter values given in [19]) 
 
 
(a) Prob(Stay). The black line is the theoretical probability p = 0.64 
 
(b) Unemployment rate. The black line is the theoretical probability u = 0.08 
 
It is then possible to use the simulation model to analyse firm demography. As an 
example, the resulting figures for the parameters values given in [19] are reported 
below: 
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(a) Firm size distribution at t=200 
 
(b) Firm number 
 
5. Extensions of the model 
 
In this section, I deal with the relaxation of some assumptions of the model. In 
particular, some variations in the structure of the stochastic wage multiplier sf,t are 
considered. When s is correlated across firms or in time, or is dependent on the business 
cycle variable g, it becomes difficult to solve analytically for the probabilities of a 
successful Stay or Join decision, but for simple cases. For instance, when s is firm-  35
specific i.e. sf,t = sf , workers always want to stay, once they are employed in a firm 
offering a high enough wage (which they will sooner or later find). They then become 
unemployed only if (randomly) fired, when the firm is experiencing negative growth. 
The fact that in more complicated cases the probability of a successful choice becomes 
difficult to compute has not merely analytical consequences. One could question 
whether real individuals could be thought of acting as if they were able to make such 
complex computations, in order to take the best choice. The realism of the model is thus 
challenged. When complex feedbacks are involved, it becomes more sensible to 
consider simpler individual choice rules, thus abandoning the realm of maximization in 
favour of a bounded rationality model of individual behaviour.  
 
The first step is thus changing slightly the rules of the game: 
•  Workers have adaptive expectations concerning their future wage, and they 
discount them for a simple proxy of the probability of being fired, the 
unemployment rate:  e w w t f STAY ⋅ = , . 
•  As for the expected payoff resulting from applying for other jobs, workers take 
the average wage of all employees, multiplied for the probability of one of their 
application being selected, which remains unchanged: 
SUCC
JOIN t JOIN P w w ⋅ = . Note 
that the average wage of all employees may differ from () s + 1 , since workers 
with a low s are more willing to change their job. The expected number of 
vacancies is again thought to be the same as in the last period. 
•  When considering the option to start a new business, workers expect a payoff 
equal to the average wage of all entrepreneurs, net of the start-up costs: 
J w w t START START α − = ,  
 
These rules are simple variations of those of the analytical model, which trade off 
optimality for computability and simplicity. When combined with firm- and time-
specific wage shocks sf,t they typically produce cycles. These cycles are characterized 
both by periods of sharp decline in the number of active firms, and consequent steep rise   36
of the unemployment rate, and by periods in which the number of firms and the 
unemployment rate ‘breath’ in and out more regularly. 
 
Figure 8: Outcome of non-optimising model (parameter values given in [19]) 
 
(a) Unemployment rate 
 
(b) Firm number 
 
Overall, these results do not differ much from those of the optimising model, although 
the dynamics appear a little more well-behaved. The analytical model is thus shown to 
be robust to its operationalization, and to small departures from optimising behaviour. 
 
Having a robust model of individual behaviour, it is now possible to add some structure 
to the stochastic wage multiplier sf,t . Among the many possible variations, two simple 
extensions of the benchmark model are presented here.    37
 
5.1 Auto-correlation of start-up profits 
Suppose start-ups do not get their sf,t from the Ds distribution, but rather from the actual 
distribution of other start-uppers. This may cause a self-sustaining process: following 
some particularly high extraction of the sf,t among the first start-uppers, expectations of 
start-up profits will rise, hence producing more start-ups, which will also enjoy high 
profits. However, this will slowly raise the average s, thus leading, in conjunction with a 
decreased unemployment rate, to a higher probability of Stay decisions. Eventually, the 
number of start-uppers will decrease, thus making it easier for unlucky low-profit start-
ups to impact the average start-up profits. A new period characterized by few low-wage 
start-ups can start, and last until a new generation of lucky new businesses will appear.  
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The black line on each graph represents the equilibrium value in the analytical model. 
The dynamics look now more complex, with periods of high unemployment alternating 
to periods with almost full employment. Moreover, many combinations of the parameter 
values give rise to either full employment or full unemployment situations, which 
become very stable, once established. 
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Figure 9: Outcome of model 5.1 (parameter values given in [21]) 
   
(a) Stayers  (b) Start-uppers (% of non-stayers) 
   
(c) Unemployment rate  (d) Number of firms 
Black lines represents equilibrium values in the reference (analytical) model 
   39
5.2 Correlation of profits and business cycle shocks 
This last model enriches the previous one, by adding autocorrelation in the business 
cycle and letting wages to depend on the business cycle. More precisely, each period the 








g g U g
g
+
= +  
 
The start-up expected and actual profits are computed as in the model of section 5.1, 
while for existing firms the wage shock is interacted with the business cycle in the 
following way: 
 
[22]  ) 1 ( ) , ( 1 1 , + + + ⋅ = t H L t f g s s U s  
 
As before, the actual extraction of U(sL,sH) is known to employees at time t, but the 
extraction gt+1 is not. 
A typical outcome is reported in figure 10. The same values of the parameters as in the 
previous section were used. Again, subsets of the parameters space lead to very stable 
and polarized (either full employment or full unemployment) equilibria.    40
Figure 10: Outcome of model 5.2 (parameter values given in [21]) 
(a) Stayers  (b) Start-uppers (% of non-stayers) 
 
(c) Unemployment rate  (d) Number of firms 
Black lines represents equilibrium values in the reference (analytical) model   41
6. Conclusions 
 
In this paper I have provided an analytical model of (two-sided) search in the labour 
market, with optimising individuals. With respect to the previous literature on the topic, 
this model allows the joint investigation of unemployment and firm dynamics, by explicitly 
considering the vacancy generation process of firms. The convergence of the model to the 
equilibrium is tested through an agent-based simulation, which also shows that a non-
optimising but more realistic version of the model leads to basically the same results. This 
bounded rationality version of the model is then used to investigate the effects of different 
(and more realistic) assumptions about wages and the business cycle.  
 
Overall, the simulation models show that, by adding realistic features to the behaviour of 
the individuals and to the structure  of the model, it is relatively easy to obtain more 
interesting dynamics, as compared to those of the reference model. While small changes 
towards more realistic models of individual behaviour do not significantly alter the 
outcome, thus showing the robustness of the benchmark model, small changes in its 
structure may lead to outcomes that bear little resemblance with those of origin. More 
detailed investigations of the latter models, and of how they are related with the basic one, 
are left for future research.   42
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